

The Islam Defence Action: A Challenge of Islamic Movement to Democratic Transition in the Post 2014 Indonesia

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Abstract

The Islam Defense Action in Jakarta during November to December 2016 was the largest protest movement that ever been held in Indonesia and brought national concerns over political instability. Hundred of thousands to millions of people overwhelmed the streets protesting the alleged blasphemy on Islam by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a candidate for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election that has a close connection to President Joko Widodo. This article analyzes the outbreak of the protest movement as a depiction of the strategic influence of Islamic groups in the midst of political upheaval threat. The protest movement showed a struggle to defend their values, but on the other hand, its political impact cannot be disclaimed. Above all of the phenomena, Islam Defense Action implies that religious sentiment still interacts with the politics and challenging the role of Islamic civil society to democratic transition in the post-2014 Indonesia.

Keywords: political Islam, civil society, democracy, protest action, political stability

INTRODUCTION*

In understanding the relationship between religion and politics in Indonesia lately, some conditions need to be examined and elaborated to describe the complexity of the issues related to Islamic movement. This paper scrutinizes the dynamic of Islamic civil society in interfering the democratic transition in the post-2014. This period is interesting to be examined because the political tension was getting heat up since some Islamic groups consistently criticize the government of Joko Widodo or popularly known as "Jokowi." The mobilization of mass with a strong Islamic symbol was become a new prominent opposing power and alarming the democratic transition for social political fragmentations by religious base.

The sentiment from some Islamic groups toward Jokowi's government was not suddenly arrived. Since the 2014 presidential election there were polarization of the two camps of candidates. The first candidat, Prabowo-Hatta have supporter from Gerindra Party (Partai Gerindra), National Mandat Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), National Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), Golkar Party (Partai Golkar), and the Crescent

Moon Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). The second candidate, Jokowi, who is genuine cadres of Indonesia Democracy Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) coupled with Jusuf Kalla. They had support from PDIP, Nation Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), National Democrat Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat, Nasdem), Hanura Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat), and Indonesia Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI). Considering the ideological background of the mass and the supporting parties, we can observe that the Islamic parties, such PKS and PPP and Muslim mass-based party, the PAN, were at the Prabowo-Hatta camp. Meanwhile, the PKB was the only Muslim-based parties that existed in the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla's coalition.

After the 2014 presidential election was over and won by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, supporters polarization was not necessarily meltdown although all the Islamic parties, except PKS, have joined the government. Suspicion and cynicism from some Islamic groups remained to increase as a result of the heat tension of presidential election at the mass root that divide Islamic purist and the progressives. The disappointment of some Islamic groups increasingly sharpened when President Jokowi allegedly defend Ahok in various legal case. The climax, when Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, or known as Ahok, as the Governor of Jakarta was purportedly insulting the Koran in an official speech at Kepulauan Seribu that became viral on social media. Delayed

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response of the government to the case led various Islamic organizations shed his grievance with mass demonstrations in Jakarta during October to December 2016.

The event of a protest movement held in Jakarta on October 17, 2016, November 4, 2016, and December 2, 2016, that involving hundreds of thousands to millions of people from various Islamic groups. The action is known as The Islam Defense Action (*Aksi Bela Islam*), which demand justice for alleged defamation committed by Ahok, the incumbent candidate for 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. He and Djarot were supported by PDIP, Nasdem Party, Golkar Party, and Hanura. On another side, the challengers come from Agus Yudhoyono-Silvyana (Democrat Party, PKB, PPP, PAN) and Anis Baswedan-Sandiaga (Gerindra Party and PKS). Looking at the party's coalition composition, it is easily to predict that the crisscrossing of religious and politics as happened in presidential election would reappear in Jakarta gubernatorial. At this level, the protest movement, whether intentional or not, could interfere Jakarta gubernatorial process that put Ahok in less fortunate position.

During the demonstration, the protesters conducted peacefully act that in general still following the corridor of law and democratic values. However, the abundant of mass who joined the protest were terrified the government. When millions of people overwhelmed the streets, the situation could be politically dangerous and put the government regime at a great risk. As Porta & Diani [1] stated, the disruption of daily routines increases with numbers directed to the regime's ability to control crowds inevitably suffers as they grow larger. Jokowi then responded with conducting intensive meeting with some major party leaders, key Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Indonesia Ulema Board (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) as well as Indonesia's main military forces. A set of circumstances that depict national stability was at stake.

The political dynamics and religious sentiment around the Islam Defence Action highlighted the role of Islamic civil society to perform a counterbalancing power to meet their demand. Ironically, the movement's impact on the practical politics cannot be avoided and the positive role of Islamic civil society to democratic transition is in challenge. Civil society is a number of organizations or institutions who asserted the people's interests. The main characteristics of

civil society is in its sphere that located between the family and the state, enjoyed autonomy from the state and driven by the volunteerism of the members of the community [2]. In a democratic political system, civil society became an important element because it provides a vehicle to articulate and promote the interests of the people dealing with the state and the government that are likely to be influenced by market forces and political elites.

The development of civil society in religious community experiencing a little paradox. Civil society was originally formed to oppose the regime who hold divinity ruling [3]. However, religious organizations eventually play a political role in the public sphere [4]. In the context of Muslim countries, the Islamic activism and Islamic movement is differentiated from political Islam. The earlier concentrated in non-state realm, religiocivil community, and ideological basis, while the later has a clear political goals [5]. Interestingly, the Islam Defence Action serve in between nonstate realm and political ends dimension. Through a protest movement, the Islamic organizations was not only struggle to convey a message to the government as well as public that can be seen explicitly or implicitly [6], but also could play a crucial role to determine the pole of political power in a winding manner. There are some questions need to be answered in this article regarding the phenomenon. First, how Islamic civil society in Indonesia faced a demanding situation when they are trying to maintain a strategic political position? Second, what is the significance of the Islam Defence Movement to the practical politics both at local (Jakarta) and national level?

MATERIAL AND METHOD

The analysis of this article was built by qualitative approach that used literature study combined with news investigation. Comparative historical explanation emphasized to the period before 2014 and after 2014 in order to construct analytical framework about how the Islamic civil society interact with democracy in Indonesia political context. The elaboration will be presented in the first part of discussion. In the second part, the social base and ideology of party analysis is used to explain on how the new emerging power of Jokowi and his Nationalist-left party, PDIP, was responded by some Islamic civil organizations and in turn shaping political contest in the post 2014 election. The third

discussion will examine how the Islamic mass actions against the allegedly Islam blasphemy depict the crisscrossing of politics and religion around the Jakarta gubernatorial that associate with broader political contest.

Data Collection

The data collected through documents from previous research that relevant with Islamic civil society and democracy in Indonesia discourse. The information about the event of The Islam Defence Action was retrieved from online news and particular Islamic organization's website during October to December 2016. The event information from news also complement other discussion with broader time period. However, to keep the objectivity of information from agency. The news were selected if it displayed in two or three main news agencies that has no substantive differentiation regarding the content but only one presented as a reference.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Islamic Civil Society and Democracy in Indonesia

In the Indonesian context, the rise of Islamic civil society is influenced by several factors. First, the increased of economic growth, especially in the era of the New Order. Secondly, the rise of the middle class. Third, the rise of Islamic movements, and forth, the increasing demands for democratization. These four factors are also driven by economic globalization and the rapid use of information technology [7]. The Indonesia economic growth happened in the 1980s due to rising oil prices increase the surplus for the country. It made the society's welfare got improved which in turn also affects the growth of the middle class. However, the attitude of the Suharto regime against the Islamic groups was more influenced by the principle of utility-oriented for their power protection. Therefore, the relationship of the New Order regime with Islamic groups continue to experience ups and downs. In 1973, the New Order regime united all political parties into three major parties to be more easily controlled. Various Islamist parties like Muslim Party of Indonesia (Parmusi), NU Party (Partai Nahdlatul Ulama), and The Unity of Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) were fused into the PPP. The parties of the left-wing, nationalist, and Christian were incorporated in the PDI. While the regime themselves formed a Golkar as a political vehicle that embodied the elements of the military and other regime supporters. In the

1990s, as some of the prominent army elites started less support the New Order regime, Suharto turned his attention to the conservative Islamic groups, including encouraging the formation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) to gain political support (Liddle 1996).

There are two largest civil organizations and become mainstream in the referral community in Indonesia, namely the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In the New Order era, Islamic civil society organizations were allowed to operate as long as not to promote political Islam or challenge the regime's power. However, NU and Muhammadiyah have enormous members and supporters that making them less subject to Suharto's authoritarian approach. For example, in 1991, a major figure of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, in a brave manner forming democratic forum for protesting the regime intolerance toward ethnicity and sectarianism. He also criticized the formation of ICMI as the manipulative step of Suharto among the Muslims [8]. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, dozens of Islamic political parties and many Islamic civil organizations have emerged. They expressed political views openly and freely. Even some Muslim organizations did not hesitate to tend to be the hardliners and radicals, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Laskar Islam, Laskar Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad, and Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia [9].

After the reform, various Islamic civil organizations play a major role in the dynamics of national politics. Almost every government regime established close ties with Islamic groups and some of them even serve as a support base. For example, the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) and Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI) provided support to the transition government of BJ. Habibie (1998-1999) [9]. The presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999 also favored by the role of a central axis that was driven by Islamist politicians, mainly from PKB, PAN, PPP, PBB, and Justice Party (PK). Those parties are also known have mass base from various Islamic organizations. Unfortunately, Wahid political capital was not enough to hold impeachment of the House of Representatives (DPR) in 2001 due to the incompetence of his administration [10].

In Megawati's period (2001-2004), Indonesia began facing difficult situation regarding radical Islamist groups. After the 9/11 terror attack, Megawati expressed sympathy and committed to working with the United States to combat international terrorism. Nevertheless, Megawati step was getting criticism from some Islamic groups. They accused Megawati had put Indonesia in a position that could be controlled by the United States. When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Islamic groups hardliners held a demonstration in Jakarta rejecting the Bush military act and urged Megawati to condemn the invasion. However, Megawati refused the demands. The protestors accused her of being servant to the United States. Since then, the government was increasingly considered to have opposite stance to the Islamist groups [11].

In the era of Yudhoyono's administration, Indonesia challenge a fertile terrorism that marked with the second Bali bombings and JW Marriot bombing. The ex-jihadist from Poso conflict had also spread throughout the country and infiltrated radical Islamist groups. However, despite Yudhoyono had a military background, he did not necessarily rage all of Islamic groups who have radical tendency. He also kept the perpetuate of military intervention in politics minimize. He chose to consolidate civil organizations, including the moderate Islamic groups to maintain the institutional stability [12].

Jokowi, Islamic Civil Organization, and Political Contest

Ahead of the 2014 presidential election, there was an interesting dynamic of how the supporting Islamic groups giving their support to the candidates. The presidency candidate coalition parties also shaped the support mass based on religious communities. The first candidate, namely Prabowo and Hatta was backed by Gerindra Party, Golkar Party, PAN, PKS, and PPP. All of those parties, except Gerindra Party, has a strong Muslim group support base. While Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla carried by PDIP, Nasdem Party, Hanura, PKPI, and PKB. Of all the parties, only the PKB and Jusuf Kalla as a person which have strong Muslim grassroots support. During the 2014 presidential election campaign, the issues relating to religious and ideological sarcasm were not seldom raised. Jokowi frequently imaged as being anti-Islam, a Chinese descent, came from a family of communist sympathizers and pretended to be

Muslim to take part in politics. Those accusations reflected a nightmare of some Muslim groups about the country's future leader. Black campaign about Jokowi scattered through various digital media such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. The results of the 2014 presidential election then won by Jokowi as president and Jusuf Kalla as vice president. However, the cleavage of imagined ideologies in presidency still affected a mass base support when Jokowi was running the government. He has a strong supporter mainly from nationalist-left groups and got a high cynical from purist Islamic groups.

However, after running the government, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla immediately consolidated Islamic civil society organizations, especially the NU and Muhammadiyah. Some NU cadres appointed as ministers in the cabinet, such as Khofifah Indar Parawangsa, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Marwan Ja'far, Imam Nahrawi and Dhakiri Muhammad Hanif, Muhammad Nasir, Nusron Wahid [13]. while the cadres of Muhammadiyah who sits in Jokowi's cabinet are Nina Moeloek and Muhajir Effendy. Jokowi did not release the importance of support from Islamic civil organizations to maintain the stability of his government.

At the beginning of his rule, President Jokowi strived to improve the aspect of tolerance towards minority communities. The Minister of the Interior, Tjahyo Kumolo, imposed civil administration law to create fairness for all faiths, including local faiths. He then proposed to delete the religion column on the citizen's identity card [14]. Nevertheless, the effort got opposition mainly from conservative Islamic groups. For example, NU rejected the plans for religion column elimination on identity card because it would let people's freedom go wild. According to them, people should choose one of the religion that recognized in Indonesia constitution [15]. The case has caused controversy; they who criticized the plan suspect that there was a secularization agenda behind President Jokowi policies. Suspicions got higher when the celebration of *Isra 'Mi'raj* on 15 May 2015, the ministers of religion held a reading of the Koran using the tone of Dandang Gulo which is one of the songs in Javanese style. Some Islamic groups then blasted the practice because it did not correspond to either the rules or procedure of reading a scripture (*tajwid*).

The controversy between the government and Islamic groups also continues when Jusuf

Kalla suggested that many of mosques misuse loudspeakers, so it disrupted other people. In June 2015, Jusuf Kalla in his capacity as Chairman of the Indonesian Mosque Council asked the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) to discuss this mosque loudspeakers problem [16] Jusuf Kalla's statement about the mosque's loudspeaker was getting a lot of resistance from Islamic organizations and mosque officials.

President Jokowi sought to neutralize the negative opinion from Islamic groups against him. He did safari visits to several Islamic boarding schools. In April 2015, Jokowi attended boarding schools in Solo and Surabaya. In January 2016, Jokowi visited boarding schools in Cirebon. In June 2016, Jokowi and the first lady attended boarding school in Tegal, Central Java. Jokowi also kept his promise to establish a national *santri* day the first time on October 22, 2016 that held in Serang, Banten. In addition, Jokowi supported the inauguration of the International Islamic University of Indonesia on June 29, 2016, higher education institutions that would be under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. These efforts indicate that Jokowi considers the necessary support from Islamic elements to maintain national stability.

However, a broad trust of Islamic groups cannot be built in a short time. In social media sphere, the supporters and opponents of Jokowi during the 2014 presidential election was still engaged in psycho war. It is hard to denied that many groups that criticize Jokowi come from Islamic communities who's in the previous election tend to support Prabowo-Hatta. They involved a variety of debate on the programs undertaken by the government. Jokowi supporters see the progress of development from the positive standpoint and struggle to proof that Jokowi is the real people's president who can realize his promises. While they who consistently criticize the government consider Jokowi's programs were filled with intrigues to cover the actual failure.

One issue that became the centre of the debate is about the political dynamics of the Jakarta government. The heat discourse began when Jokowi, the elected governor of Jakarta in 2012 left the office when he elected as president in 2014. The position of Jakarta governor was taken over by Ahok who previously served as deputy governor. The deputy Jakarta then gave to Djarot Saiful, a cadre of PDIP who is close to Ahok. Before leaving Jakarta, Jokowi said that he would continue to monitor its programs in

Jakarta, such as the construction of the Mass Rapid Transit and monorail. He also promised that the various problems such as floods, city disorder, traffic jam, and the poverty would be more easily overcome when he served as president. Nevertheless, the leadership of Jokowi-Ahok in Jakarta, leaving legal matters related to corruption cases of Jakarta Trans projects with a nominal nearly half a trillion rupiahs [17].

One crucial issue in the political context of Jakarta politics was the Ahok's attitude that often confrontational and aggressive towards politicians toward the province parliament (DPRD DKI Jakarta). Ahok repeatedly accused the legislators as corrupt and interfered with the government performance. Inevitably, almost all political parties lead to a hostile reaction, including Gerindra Party, Ahok former party. At the time of the 2014 presidential election, Ahok retreat from Gerindra Party because he felt his struggles were not in line anymore with the party's [18]. In addition to the reason, the resignation of Ahok was more determined by his decision to anchor his support to Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election. Automatically, the Gerindra Party lost governor position and left the power to PDIP dominance and pave the chances of victory to Jokowi/PDIP in the 2019 election. Of course, Ahok's political maneuver was getting a strong reaction from Gerindra Party.

The allegations of special closeness between Jokowi with Ahok increasingly convinced in cases of alleged corruption of Sumber Waras. The case began on May 12, 2014, when Ahok suddenly announced his intention to build a cancer hospital, because the two cancer hospitals that available were considered inadequate to serve the people. Land search was ended up in Sumber Waras Hospital. The land purchase by Jakarta Provincial Government was reaping problem. The sale price offered by the city government judged to be unreasonable. The council then advised the government to cancel the land purchase. However, Ahok stated that the land acquisition had no problem and done transparently. The Audit Board of Republic of Indonesia (BPK) then issued the audit report that reveals the land purchase violated the legal procedures. The city government land purchase was amounting to Rp. 755 billion, which is more expensive than the original, so it made a loss for the state to Rp.191 billion [19].

However, the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi,

KPK) said there was no element of lawlessness and state's budget loss in Sumber Waras case. On the statement of the KPK, some politicians pointed out that the KPK sided with Ahok. The case was then rolled into the political sphere. According to Fadli Zon, the Deputy Chairman of DPR from Gerindra Party, there were political interests that influence the decision of the KPK; there were rumours that KPK was reinforced by President Jokowi to protect Ahok in the case of Sumber Waras [20]. A Protest demanding KPK to caught Ahok of the case of Sumber Waras carried out by some organizations in April 2016, including from Islamic groups in Jakarta, where one of them was the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) [21].

Public assumptions that Ahok has the special relation to Jokowi was highlighted in the case of North Coast Jakarta Reclamation. Ahok was determined to continue the project after getting opposition from the Coordinator Minister for Maritime, Rizal Ramli, and the Minister for Environment, Siti Nurbaya because the project violated the law. Interestingly, the cases containing corruption after Sanusi, a member of Jakarta Parliament from Gerindra Party, and Ariesman, a man of the developer, named as a suspect by the KPK. The KPK also monitored Sunny Tanuwidjaya, Ahok's personal assistant who also has a family relation to reclamation project development company. Coordinating Minister for Maritime, Rizal Ramli, then stopped the project [22]. Ahok against the decision and resulting in the dispute between him and Rizal Ramli. This case also got attention from activists and various civil organizations, especially among fishers and university students. They made several demonstrations to reject the Jakarta coast reclamation project. However, surprisingly Jokowi dethroned Rizal Ramli from his position as Coordinating Minister for Maritime in the second cabinet reshuffle, and ultimately makes stronger allegations about Jokowi partisanship to Ahok.

The Criss-Crossing of Politics and Religion

Towards the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017, political frictions associated with Jokowi and Ahok were getting hotter. Despite the fact that Ahok's political capital was weak and face various problems, but his performance as Jakarta Governor received appreciation from the majority of residents. From various surveys, the level of satisfaction of the Jakarta's residents about Ahok leadership was high. Based on a study of the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkar

Survei Indonesia, LSI), electability of Ahok was still the highest at 53 percent in March 2016 [23]. The survey results of Saiful Mujani Research Center in October showed electability Ahok also still ahead of approximately 45 percent [24]. Although electability of Ahok tended to decrease, he was still dominant among the other candidates. However, the poor relations with political parties make a little late of Ahok candidacy. He had even planned to register the candidacy through independent channels with volunteers group called "Friends of Ahok" (*Temannya Ahok*). But in the last-minute of candidacy registration to the electoral commission, Ahok decided to move forward with political party. He was paired with Djarot Saiful, a cadre of PDIP, as the deputy candidate. Ahok and Djarot were carried by PDIP, Nasdem Party, Golkar Party, and Hanura Party. The other pairs of candidates are Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno promoted by PKS and Gerindra Party, and Agus Yudhoyono and Sylviana Murni supported by the Democratic Party, PAN, PKB, and PPP.

Political contest in Jakarta was vulnerable to the issue of racism as the background of Ahok is a Protestant and descendants of Indonesian Chinese. The problem of racism surrounding the Jakarta gubernatorial election has begun to appear in the response of the community in a variety of media, especially social media. Issues were developed as a bullet to drop Ahok electability among other are the prohibition for Muslims in choosing the leader of the infidels and the danger of Chinese to dominance Jakarta. However, such issues did not interfere electability of Ahok. Most of Jakarta residents wanted Ahok as the next governor with good reason; Ahok performance was considered fulfill the citizen's satisfaction. He also perceived as successful in making Jakarta much better. Unfortunately, the Ahok sympathizers were often retaliated their attackers with discourses that contain religious scoff. For example, they state that it is better led by infidels but clean rather than by Muslims but corrupt. Then, Ahok himself saying that he was proud to be infidels but not corrupt [25].

The response that given by Ahok against racist attacks even wilder and aggravate the political tension. When Ahok was conducting an official visit at Kepulauan Seribu on September 27, 2016, he claimed not to force people to vote for him in the elections and called on citizens not to be fooled by the parties using verses from the Koran (Al-Maidah 51). The speech then became

viral in cyberspace and instantly reap public reaction [26] On October 7, 2016, Habib Novel Chaidir Hasan, a cleric from FPI later sued Ahok on suspicion of committing a blasphemous. The reaction of Islamic groups for alleged blasphemy by Ahok was intensified and expanded. On October 10, 2016, Ahok later apologize for his statement even though he did not feel guilty for what he was not meant insulting Islam. However, Islamic groups still did not accept it and plan large demonstrations to encourage law enforcement to handle Ahok case. Nevertheless, the police did not immediately determine the suspect status to Ahok because of there was a legal procedure that regulates if a candidate suspected as law breaking, the law process should be postponed until the election is completed. However, groups of protesters judged that the police had sided with Ahok so that the cases must be escorted by the mass actions.

Various protests demanding legal proceedings against Ahok not only happened in Jakarta but also in other regions, such as in Medan, Surabaya, Tegal, Solo, and Sampit. In mid-October 2016, thousands of people from various Islamic civil organizations took to the streets condemned the statement Ahok that was considered as an insult to the Koran and urged the police to imprison Ahok immediately. There are pros and cons in the community response to whether Ahok did blasphemy. The opposite of Ahok believes that the speech of Ahok, regardless of any context, have abused the Koran, while others consider the remark of Ahok was not an insult to the Koran because what he meant was the people who use the verses of the Koran to incite voters. However, the MUI then issued a fatwa that Ahok had conduct a blasphemy and made the protest exacerbated.

A larger and organized demonstrations then held in Jakarta on Friday, October 14, 2016. The demonstrations were coordinated by FPI and The National Movement to Defend Fatwa of Indonesia Ulema Council (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa-MUI, GNPf-MUI). It was attended by more than twenty thousand people. The events were given the name of the Islam Defense Action. They were conducting march and rally in front of Jakarta City Hall. The demonstrators demanded the police to process the case of Ahok [27]. Although it has been doing a great demonstration on October 14, the Islamic groups were not satisfied and considered the legal process was slow so purportedly protected

by the ruling power. Then, the event of The Defence Islam Action was held back a second time on November 4, 2016, entitled The Defence Islam Action II which requires the police to arrest Ahok and set him as suspects in the defamation. The demonstration participants consist of hundreds of thousands people that gathered at the Istiqlal Mosque and moving toward the police headquarters, the Presidential Palace, and the City Hall. They filled every corner in Patung Kuda to Medan Merdeka area. The participants came from various regions, such as Bandung, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Makassar, Palembang, Maluku, Madura, Surabaya, Lampung, and Yogyakarta. The leaders of Islamic organizations also joined in the protest action, such as KH Abdullah Gymnastiar alias Aa Gym, KH Ma'ruf Amin, and Habib Rizieq Shihab, KH. Cholil Ridwan (TAPI3), KH. Tengku Zulkarnain (MUI), Sukatsyah (Umat Islam Bersatu), Nur Akma Diati (PP Forsap FUII), Wirawan Adnan (GNPF-MUI), Abdul Rashid (Asyafiiyah). Those political leaders who were present among others Amien Rais (PAN), Fadli Zon (Gerindra Party) and Fahri Hamzah (Vice Chairman of DPR from PKS).

Jokowi said that The Defence Islam Action II as an action ridden by political actors aimed at creating a political instability. Although not explicitly mentioned, these allegations later led to the Yudhoyono and Democratic Party which carrying Agus-Silvy as a challenger of Ahok-Djarot. Yudhoyono accused of being the actor who rode Islamic mass mobilization on November 4, 2016, although later he denied through a press conference at his residence [28] The accusation clearly stated by Bony Hargens, an academician from the University of Indonesia known as pro-government analyst. Democrat Party then sued him to the police [29]. Allegations of President Jokowi further aggravate the problem. Islamic groups did not accept that they were considered to be driven by certain political interest. Along with the heating atmosphere, President Jokowi performed political safari to the two largest Islamic organizations; NU, Muhammadiyah, and to the prominent ulema body, MUI. Also, President Jokowi conducted a safari to several political figures, among others Prabowo, Setya Novanto, and Megawati, while the meeting with Yudhoyono made by Jusuf Kalla. President Jokowi then continued to meet the military elite forces, among others are special forces from Indonesian Army (Kopassus), Air Force (Paskhas), Navy (Marinir), and Indonesian Police (Brimob). The

meeting with the military ranks implying that the pressure from Islamic organizations had led to the regime of Jokowi insecurity, so he needs to strengthen its ranks to make sure the state instruments were behind him if the worst situation would appear.

In the midst of an increasingly immense pressure, the police then set Ahok as a suspect on November 26, 2016. However, Ahok did not detained by the police. The protesters then compared to the government's treatment of Ahok to the treatment of other blasphemer in the past, such as Lia Eden and Arswendo who were immediately detained. They demanded the same treatment to Ahok. The demand was realized through the third The Defence Islam Action that held in Monas area on December 2, 2016, or known as the Act of 212. The demonstration was greater than ever. The attendees were millions from across the region of Indonesia. Although the police have sought to anticipate the number of participants, the protesters imposed their will. The group from Ciamis and Bogor even went to Jakarta on foot as the police gave no recommendation to the bus company to provide the transportation facility. The police effort unintendedly had increased the sympathy of the action. In the midst of widespread insistence, President Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla eventually attend Friday prayers in Monas where the lector was Habib Riziq, the high priest of FPI. The mass action was running well and successfully urged the Police to promise in resolving Ahok case.

In line with the widespread protests against Ahok for alleged blasphemy, Ahok-Djarot very disturbed by many acts of the refusal acts of their visit campaigns. Ahok-Djarot casted a complaint, because the refusal act was indicated conducted systematically to harm them. On the other hand, the survey results showed electability of Ahok-Djarot tends to decline after the Defence Islam Action on 4 November 2016. The results of a survey carried by Indonesia Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia), led by Denny JA stated that Ahok electability has decreased every month. In March 2016 their electability slumped to 59.3 percent in July to 49.1 percent, 31.4 percent in October, and 24.6 percent in November [30]. The survey states that 89 percent of Jakarta residents recognize this defamation case, but as much as 73.2 percent of respondents said that the speech of Ahok in Kepulauan Seribu was a slip tongue that could happen to anybody. Although electability Ahok

decreased, he was still in the highest compared to other candidates who tend to stagnate, namely Agus-Sylviana as much as 20.9 percent and 20 percent Anies-Sandiaga. A total of 34.5 percent respondent stated as undecided and potential as swing voters (24). Ahok-Djarot was also still the strongest candidate in 2017 gubernatorial based on the level of satisfaction survey results conducted by the Indonesian Poltracking Survey Institute that as many as 52.5 percent said they are satisfied with the performance of Ahok as governor. Jakarta residents also said they were pleased with the development undertaken by Ahok. The levels of health care more affordable, educational services with Jakarta Smart Card was also get better, and the construction of infrastructure or public facilities were increased [31]. However, Ahok chance to continue his rule in the second period would be vanished if he was in custody.

The crisscrossing between religious and political sentiments have changed the dynamics of politics in the context of Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, national politics, and the repositioning of Islamic groups in the national politics. One significant political repositioning was the return of Setya Novanto as the Chairman of DPR, which become a public question since he tripped in a case of profiteering Jokowi name in a secret negotiation on government projects in 2015. Both Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla showed anger toward Novanto at that time. As a result of public pressure, he finally resigned as the chairman of DPR in December 2015. However, long before the pressure on government by the Defence Islam Action, Golkar Party under Novanto continued to provide political support for Jokowi. Golkar Party even become the first party to declare Jokowi as a presidential candidate for 2019 election. Not long after the meeting between Jokowi and Novanto amid of the Defence Islam Action pressure, Golkar Party got Chairman of DPR position back to Novanto which was formerly held by Ade Komarudin. The substitution of chairman of DPR was believed to strengthen the Golkar Party support to the government. In relation to the Ahok case, there were internal frictions in Golkar Party because party's decision to support Ahok in Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017. The youth faction of Golkar party and a few elites showed their opposition stance to the party's decision. However, Jokowi government required the full support of Golkar Party, who has 91 seats in DPR,

to assure political stability and Novanto seems to be the right person to handle the task.

On the other hand, the movement of the Defence Islam Action has led hardliner Islamic group's leaders to be popular. They include Habib Rizieq Shihab from FPI and Bachtiar Nasir from the Indonesia Council of Intellectual and Young Ulema (MIUI), who organized a movement organization called GNPf-MUI. Habib Rizieq, a controversial figure due to his association with violence and hard speech, eventually appeared as a prominent Islamic mass leader on the national stage. With their actions, some Islamic civil society increasingly enthusiastic, which they call for and support the leader from Islamic-based. Islamic groups and civil organizations no longer simply act as the supporting components for the certain party and government, but has begun to show the potency to build democracy based on Islamic mass power in the future of Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

In the post-2014, Jokowi administration not only face the problem of consolidation of political elites, but also face the increasingly thickening critical mass to the government. The critical mass mainly comes from Islamic groups or communities that since the early Jokowi's period were less embraced because of ideological bearer that PDIP has. Although Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla has sought to build trust with NU and Muhammadiyah as a representation of Indonesia's largest Islamic civil organizations, it turns out that the effort to dilute suspicion of Islamic groups to the regime was not enough.

The Defence Islam Action that occurs three times in October, November and December proved that the strength of Islamic groups is still significant to the dynamics of national politics. The pressure exerted by various Islamic civil organizations at least had cause the government work agenda disturbed. Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla repeatedly make the political safari to ensure the solidity of the political support. In other words, Islamic civil organizations play the role as a counterweight to the state power that has been perceived as opposing their values. They can urge the government without presenting anarchist action, although they have the possible amount of mass to make chaos. Moreover, during this time the groups involved in the protests are tended to criticize the regime long before the blasphemy case. That phenomenon proves that the Islamic organizations in Indonesia were able

to do a civil movement that is consistent with democratic principles. They keep making the nationalism as the prominent value on the basis of love of their religion. Perhaps no country has succeeded to apply the interface between nationalism and religiosity like Indonesia. Islamic groups in Indonesia can combine nationalism and religion in a harmonious relationship.

But on the other hand, the political impact caused by the Defence Islam Action cannot be denied. Islamic civil society movement as occurs in the Defence Islam Action could, intentionally or not, give the political advantages to the opposing candidate as indicated by a decrease of Ahok electability. The impact is also seen in the context of national politics, as reflected in their return of Novanto as the DPR chairman. President Jokowi increasingly sought to strengthen political consolidation with various parties, both friends and foe. The political tension around Ahok case also shows that the regime has not come out of the problem of political consolidation that fought during the two-year rule. Jokowi, who had insisted the slim and unconditional government coalition, has built a political power bloc that difficult to disbursed. On top of all these phenomena, The Islam Defence Action movement implies that religious sentiment still interacts with the politics and could intensely shape Indonesia democracy transition in the post 2014.

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